Authors: Lamar Waldron
could gain notice in a Congress under firm Democratic control.
Ford wasted no time in using his new position to curry favor with the
person who had replaced Bobby Kennedy as America’s second most pow-
erful man, J. Edgar Hoover. Just a week after the Warren Commission’s
first meeting, Ford went to one of Hoover’s top aides, who wrote that
Ford told him “he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities
of the Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential
basis.” Five days later, Ford started delivering on his promise, and was
soon telling his FBI contact that “two members of the Commission . . .
still were not convinced that the President had been shot from the sixth
floor window of the Texas Book Depository.”27 Hoover’s Assistant Direc-
tor, William Sullivan, later said that Gerald Ford “was our man on the
Commission . . . it was to him that we looked to protect our interest
and keep us fully advised of any development that we did not like . . .
and this he did.” While Ford’s general role as an FBI informant has
been known for years, almost all of his reports were kept classified until
August 2008, when several were released.28
All of the members of the Warren Commission were respected estab-
lishment figures who could be counted on to maintain a good public
face, despite any private doubts they might have. Except for Dulles, they
had full-time positions aside from the Commission, leaving them little
free time to seriously investigate areas the FBI had not already explored.
While the Commission hired a staff of lawyers, it essentially had to rely
on the FBI for most of its investigations.
J. Edgar Hoover hated the idea of the Commission even more than LBJ
did, and Hoover managed to essentially determine its conclusion before
the Commissioners really had a chance to get started. On December 8,
1963, Hoover leaked the FBI’s own assassination report, and used his
extensive media connections to make sure it was front-page news.
Time
magazine
said the FBI report
. . . was expected to be forwarded to the Warren Commission some-
time this week. It will indicate that 1. Oswald, acting in his own luna-
tic loneliness, was indeed the President’s assassin; 2. Ruby likewise
was a loner in his role as Oswald’s executioner; 3. Oswald and Ruby
did not know each other; and 4. There is no proof of a conspiracy,
either foreign or domestic, to do away with Kennedy.29
The Warren Commissioners were stunned. Representative Hale Boggs
said privately that the FBI had “tried the case and reached a verdict”
barely two weeks after JFK’s murder.30 Hoover put the Commissioners
in a straitjacket: If they reached any other conclusions, they would be
going up against the much admired FBI and its powerful Director.
Hoover’s report on the assassination would undermine both the FBI’s
and the Warren Commission’s actions in the coming year, even though
the FBI report had severe problems. The FBI accounted for only the three
shots it claimed Oswald fired—one that hit JFK in the back, one that hit
him in the head, and one that hit Connally—but failed to acknowledge
the shot that missed the limo entirely, hitting a curb far from the motor-
cade. The story might have ended there, except for the bullet fragment
or chip from the curb that hit a bystander, who then talked to police and
newsmen. This created the problem of a “fourth shot” that wouldn’t go
away. In addition, the FBI had only recently learned about, and had not
accounted for, Oswald’s visit to Manolo Ray supporter Silvia Odio in
Dallas. In terms of Oswald’s motivation, the FBI tried to steer clear of
any political motivation that could raise the specter of Cuban or Rus-
sian involvement. It focused instead on Oswald’s mother, evoking the
“domineering, disturbed mother produces murderous son” scenario
depicted in the popular film
Psycho
.31
Despite the authoritative nature of Hoover’s report, even high-ranking
FBI officials doubted its conclusions.
Vanity Fair
quoted William Sul-
livan, the FBI Assistant Director who also served as its Domestic Intel-
ligence Chief, as saying, “There were huge gaps in the case, gaps we
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LEGACY OF SECRECY
never did close.” Those on the Warren Commission were dissatis-
fied as well: Senator Richard Russell said, “We have not been told the
truth about Oswald.” Congressman Hale Boggs was eventually even
more blunt in his assessment, saying Hoover “lied his eyes out to the
Commission—on Oswald, on Ruby, on their friends, the bullets, the
gun, you name it.”32
Russell and Boggs may not have realized it, but Richard Helms was
withholding even more information from the Warren Commission. Even
as the Commission had its first meetings, some of the top-secret anti-
Castro operations Helms withheld from it were still unfolding.
For Commander Almeida in Cuba, the days after JFK’s assassination
must have been fraught with tension, especially when Harry told him
Bobby had put the coup plan on hold. Some Cuban officials worried
about an American attack because of Oswald’s very public pro-Cuba
stance, but Almeida had more reason to worry than most, because he
knew the US was already prepared to invade. Even worse, within days
of JFK’s death, at least one rumor of a coup surfaced in Cuban govern-
ment circles. The fact that two of Artime’s Miami exile associates had
recently reported rumors of a coup to their CIA contacts meant that
Fidel’s Miami agents might also have heard such rumblings. It’s also
possible that Castro’s agents had detected the coup preparations of one
of Almeida’s allies in the Cuban government.
Almeida decided to leave Cuba, but in a way that would not arouse
suspicion. On Thursday, November 28, 1963, a CIA memo was sent from
the Miami station to McCone, reporting the “departure [of] 2 Britannias
[airliners], probably for Algeria, with 170 Cubans aboard headed by Juan
Almeida.”33 A large group of Cubans had gone to Algeria earlier that fall
to show support for its leftist government.
Almeida’s instincts, or inside information, were correct because just
two days later, on Saturday, November 30, a CIA memo revealed that “a
Western diplomat . . . had learned [from someone in the Cuban govern-
ment] that Che Guevara was alleged to be under house arrest for plot-
ting to overthrow Castro.” This wasn’t just some rumor off the street; the
CIA said the “source” of the information about Che’s involvement “in
an anti-Castro plot” was a “trained observer of proven reliability who
is a member of the Western diplomatic community in Cuba.”34 The tim-
ing of Che’s arrest, just one day before the originally scheduled date for
Almeida’s coup, raises the possibility that Fidel had learned something
about the coup and arrested one of those he thought responsible.
While it’s possible Che was going to be an ally of Almeida for the
coup, Fidel might have focused suspicion on Che for another reason.
Three decades later, historian Jorge Castaneda first documented that
Che had been making secret plans to leave Cuba in late December 1963,
to return to his home country, Argentina, for an extended period of time.
Che told only three of his most trusted subordinates about his plan, but
not even they were not told why Che was leaving Cuba.35 Had Castro
found out about Che’s plans to leave Cuba, put them together with
reports of a possible coup, and decided to arrest Che?
As detailed in
Ultimate Sacrifice
, Che’s problems with Fidel, the Rus-
sians, and Cuba’s Communist Party were well known by the fall of 1963.
Even William Attwood, JFK’s special envoy for the secret peace talks,
said in a November 1963 memo that “there was [a] rift between Castro
and the [Che] Guevara . . . Almeida group on the question of Cuba’s
future course.” Attwood wrote that Fidel’s intermediary in Cuba told
him that “[Che] Guevara . . . regarded Castro as dangerously unreliable;
and would get rid of Castro if [Che] could carry on without [Castro] and
retain his popular support.”36 With Castro’s intermediary revealing such
concerns about Che to Attwood, it’s not surprising that Fidel would
have arrested Che if word of a coup and assassination plot surfaced.
Che’s house arrest probably lasted for only a short time, perhaps just
a day or two. December 2 is one of Cuba’s biggest holidays, the anniver-
sary of the founding of the Cuban Army, whose first battle saw Almeida
save his friend Che’s life at the start of the Revolution. As Commander
of Cuba’s Army, Almeida was also considered its founder, so the Cuban
public would definitely notice if he didn’t appear for the celebration.
Apparently, things had calmed down enough for Almeida to return from
Algeria to be part of the celebration, something he would not have done
if Almeida was worried that he was returning home to the same fate as
Che. Almeida’s only other choice would have been to make a public
break with Fidel and defect, as he had wanted to back in March 1961.
The day after the big December 2, 1963, celebration, a CIA report
says Almeida “expressed [his] despair” to a subordinate. The thirdhand
report indicated Almeida’s concern over possible American retaliation
against Cuba. Almeida appeared to be laying the groundwork with the
subordinate to explain why he might not take action against the US if
they did invade.37 Whatever his private worries, Almeida put on a good
public face, and on December 6, 1963, the Cuban radio-news service
noted Almeida’s presence at a ceremony to install a new communica-
tions minister.38
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In the second week of December 1963, John McCone and Richard Helms
were still trying to get LBJ to continue JFK’s efforts to overthrow Fidel.
Since sensitive information took time to reach CIA headquarters from
Cuba, McCone and Helms didn’t learn about Che’s house arrest until
December 10, 1963, or about Almeida’s despair until December 18. In
the interim they pressed forward, and a December 9, 1963, CIA memo
encouraged McCone to get LBJ to support “a coup in Cuba.” The memo
even mentioned JFK’s November 18 speech in Miami, which had con-
tained words intended for Almeida, and suggested that LBJ make simi-
lar remarks.39
The report of Che’s arrest must have given McCone and Helms pause.
However, by the time they learned about it, the information was ten days
old. Almeida had already returned to Cuba from Algeria and had been
seen in public. As long as Almeida was free, the coup could go forward.
Apparently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still receptive, because they
sent a memo asking if “dissatisfied Cuban military leaders represent a
coup potential.”40
LBJ planned to hold his first big meeting about Cuba on December 19,
1963, but the day before that, Richard Helms and Desmond FitzGerald
got disappointing news: A CIA report said that Raul Castro had kicked
Rolando Cubela (AMLASH) out of the Army. Cubela, never powerful to
begin with, now was reported to “be doing nothing . . . and had no plans
for the future.”41 Helms and FitzGerald could only hope that Cubela
would be allowed to keep his travel budget and house at Varadero Beach
next to Castro’s, which turned out to be the case.
LBJ’s December 19, 1963, meeting marked a major turning point in US
policy and operations against Cuba. With at least sixteen people present,
the gathering was far larger than Bobby’s typical Cuba meetings, or even
the big Cuba meeting JFK chaired ten days before his death. Notable by
his absence was Bobby, which was probably no accident on LBJ’s part.
The meeting was President Johnson’s clear signal that he was now call-
ing the shots when it came to Cuba.42
President Johnson had learned at least the broad strokes of the JFK-
Almeida coup plan, and in the meeting expressed “particular interest
in the exploitation of discontent within the Cuban military.” However,
many at the meeting had never been told about Almeida (of the five
representatives from the State Department, only Rusk had been told
about Almeida), and since there had been no decision to go forward
with the coup, the rest would not learn about it at this meeting. Thus,
comments from the CIA were still subject to the same careful wording
that had characterized JFK’s last major Cuba meeting.43 Still, the detailed
presentation from FitzGerald probably contained some new information
for LBJ, to supplement what LBJ had been learning in his almost daily
meetings with McCone—which were often brief, had to cover the whole-
world situation, and often concentrated on the disturbing information
from Mexico City.44
Desmond FitzGerald initially discussed the CIA’s support for the
“autonomous anti-Castro groups” of “Manuel Artime [and] Manolo
Ray.” FitzGerald said these groups’ purpose was to “conduct externally