The Design of Everyday Things (16 page)

Why the apparent discrepancy between the precision of behavior and the imprecision of knowledge? Because not all of the knowledge
required for precise behavior has to be in the head. It can be distributed—partly in the head, partly in the world, and partly in the constraints of the world.

FIGURE 3.1.
   
Which Is the US One-Cent Coin, the Penny?
Fewer than half of the American college students who were given this set of drawings and asked to select the correct image could do so. Pretty bad performance, except that the students, of course, have no difficulty using the money. In normal life, we have to distinguish between the penny and other coins, not among several versions of one denomination. Although this is an old study using
American coins, the results still hold true today using coins of any currency. (From Nickerson & Adams, 1979,
Cognitive Psychology
, 11 (3). Reproduced with permission of Academic Press via Copyright Clearance Center.)

Precise Behavior from Imprecise Knowledge

Precise behavior can emerge from imprecise knowledge for four reasons:

       
1.
   
Knowledge is both in the head and in the world.
Technically, knowledge can only be in the head, because knowledge requires interpretation and understanding, but once the world's structure has been interpreted and understood, it counts as knowledge. Much of the knowledge a person needs to do a task can be derived from the information in the world. Behavior is determined by combining the knowledge in the head with that in the world. For this chapter, I will use the term “knowledge” for both what is in the head and what is in the world. Although technically imprecise, it simplifies the discussion and understanding.

       
2.
   
Great precision is not required.
Precision, accuracy, and completeness of knowledge are seldom required. Perfect behavior results if the combined knowledge in the head and in the world is sufficient to distinguish an appropriate choice from all others.

       
3.
   
Natural constraints exist in the world.
The world has many natural, physical constraints that restrict the possible behavior: such things as the order in which parts can go together and the ways by which an object can be moved, picked up, or otherwise manipulated. This is knowledge in the world. Each object has physical features—projections, depressions, screw threads, appendages— that limit its relationships with other objects, the operations that can be performed on it, what can be attached to it, and so on.

       
4.
   
Knowledge of cultural constraints and conventions exists in the head.
Cultural constraints and conventions are learned artificial restrictions on behavior that reduce the set of likely actions, in many cases leaving only one or two possibilities. This is knowledge in the head. Once learned, these constraints apply to a wide variety of circumstances.

Because behavior can be guided by the combination of internal and external knowledge and constraints, people can minimize the amount of material they must learn, as well as the completeness, precision, accuracy, or depth of the learning. They also can deliberately organize the environment to support behavior. This is how nonreaders can hide their inability, even in situations where their job requires reading skills. People with hearing deficits (or with normal hearing but in noisy environments) learn to use other cues. Many of us manage quite well when in novel, confusing situations where we do not know what is expected of us. How do we do this? We arrange things so that we do not need to have complete knowledge or we rely upon the knowledge of the people around us, copying their behavior or getting them to do the required actions. It is actually quite amazing how often it is possible to hide one's ignorance, to get by without understanding or even much interest.

Although it is best when people have considerable knowledge and experience using a particular product—knowledge in the head—
the designer can put sufficient cues into the design—knowledge in the world—that good performance results even in the absence of previous knowledge. Combine the two, knowledge in the head and in the world, and performance is even better. How can the designer put knowledge into the device itself?

Chapters 1
and
2
introduced a wide range of fundamental design principles derived from research on human cognition and emotion. This chapter shows how knowledge in the world combines with knowledge in the head. Knowledge in the head is knowledge in the human memory system, so this chapter contains a brief review of the critical aspects of memory necessary for the design of usable products. I emphasize that for practical purposes, we do not need to know the details of scientific theories but simpler, more general, useful approximations. Simplified models are the key to successful application. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how natural mappings present information in the world in a manner readily interpreted and usable.

KNOWLEDGE IS IN THE WORLD

Whenever knowledge needed to do a task is readily available in the world, the need for us to learn it diminishes. For example, we lack knowledge about common coins, even though we recognize them just fine (
Figure 3.1
). In knowing what our currency looks like, we don't need to know all the details, simply sufficient knowledge to distinguish one value of currency from another. Only a small minority of people must know enough to distinguish counterfeit from legitimate money.

Or consider typing. Many typists have not memorized the keyboard. Usually each key is labeled, so nontypists can hunt and peck letter by letter, relying on knowledge in the world and minimizing the time required for learning. The problem is that such typing is slow and difficult. With experience, of course, hunt-and-peckers learn the positions of many of the letters on the keyboard, even without instruction, and typing speed increases notably, quickly surpassing handwriting speeds and, for some, reaching quite respectable rates. Peripheral vision and the feel of the keyboard
provide some knowledge about key locations. Frequently used keys become completely learned, infrequently used keys are not learned well, and the other keys are partially learned. But as long as a typist needs to watch the keyboard, the speed is limited. The knowledge is still mostly in the world, not in the head.

If a person needs to type large amounts of material regularly, further investment is worthwhile: a course, a book, or an interactive program. The important thing is to learn the proper placement of fingers on the keyboard, to learn to type without looking, to get knowledge about the keyboard from the world into the head. It takes a few weeks to learn the system and several months of practice to become expert. But the payoff for all this effort is increased typing speed, increased accuracy, and decreased mental load and effort at the time of typing.

We only need to remember sufficient knowledge to let us get our tasks done. Because so much knowledge is available in the environment, it is surprising how little we need to learn. This is one reason people can function well in their environment and still be unable to describe what they do.

People function through their use of two kinds of knowledge: knowledge
of
and knowledge
how
. Knowledge
of
—what psychologists call
declarative knowledge
—includes the knowledge of facts and rules. “Stop at red traffic lights.” “New York City is north of Rome.” “China has twice as many people as India.” “To get the key out of the ignition of a Saab car, the gearshift must be in reverse.” Declarative knowledge is easy to write and to teach. Note that knowledge of the rules does not mean they are followed. The drivers in many cities are often quite knowledgeable about the official driving regulations, but they do not necessarily obey them. Moreover, the knowledge does not have to be true. New York City is actually south of Rome. China has only slightly more people than India (roughly 10 percent). People may know many things: that doesn't mean they are true.

Knowledge
how
—what psychologists call
procedural knowledge
—is the knowledge that enables a person to be a skilled musician, to return a serve in tennis, or to move the tongue properly when
saying the phrase “frightening witches.” Procedural knowledge is difficult or impossible to write down and difficult to teach. It is best taught by demonstration and best learned through practice. Even the best teachers cannot usually describe what they are doing. Procedural knowledge is largely subconscious, residing at the behavioral level of processing.

Knowledge in the world is usually easy to come by. Signifiers, physical constraints, and natural mappings are all perceivable cues that act as knowledge in the world. This type of knowledge occurs so commonly that we take it for granted. It is everywhere: the locations of letters on a keyboard; the lights and labels on controls that remind us of their purpose and give information about the current state of the device. Industrial equipment is replete with signal lights, indicators, and other reminders. We make extensive use of written notes. We place items in specific locations as reminders. In general, people structure their environment to provide a considerable amount of the knowledge required for something to be remembered.

Many organize their lives spatially in the world, creating a pile here, a pile there, each indicating some activity to be done, some event in progress. Probably everybody uses such a strategy to some extent. Look around you at the variety of ways people arrange their rooms and desks. Many styles of organization are possible, but invariably the physical layout and visibility of the items convey information about relative importance.

WHEN PRECISION IS UNEXPECTEDLY REQUIRED

Normally, people do not need precision in their judgments. All that is needed is the combination of knowledge in the world and in the head that makes decisions unambiguous. Everything works just fine unless the environment changes so that the combined knowledge is no longer sufficient: this can lead to havoc. At least three countries discovered this fact the hard way: the United States, when it introduced the Susan B. Anthony one-dollar coin; Great Britain, a one-pound coin (before the switch to decimal currency); and France, a ten-franc coin (before the conversion to the common
European currency, the euro). The US dollar coin was confused with the existing twenty-five-cent piece (the quarter), and the British pound coin with the then five-pence piece that had the same diameter. Here is what happened in France:

          
PARIS With a good deal of fanfare, the
French government released the new 10-franc coin (worth a little more than $1.50) on Oct. 22 [1986]. The public looked at it, weighed it, and began confusing it so quickly with the half-franc coin (worth only 8 cents) that a crescendo of fury and ridicule fell on both the government and the coin
.

               
Five weeks later, Minister of Finance Edouard Balladur suspended circulation of the coin. Within another four weeks, he canceled it altogether
.

               
In retrospect, the French decision seems so foolish that it is hard to fathom how it could have been made. After much study, designers came up with a silver-colored coin made of nickel and featuring a modernistic drawing by artist Joaquim Jimenez of a Gallic rooster on one side and of Marianne, the female symbol of the French republic, on the other. The coin was light, sported special ridges on its rim for easy reading by electronic vending machines and seemed tough to counterfeit
.

               
But the designers and bureaucrats were obviously so excited by their creation that they ignored or refused to accept the new coin's similarity to the hundreds of millions of silver-colored, nickel-based half-franc coins in circulation [whose] size and weight were perilously similar
. (Stanley Meisler. Copyright © 1986,
Los Angeles Times
. Reprinted with permission.)

The confusions probably occurred because the users of coins had already formed representations in their memories that were only sufficiently precise to distinguish among the coins that they were accustomed to using. Psychological research suggests that people maintain only partial
descriptions of the things to be remembered. In the three examples of new coins introduced in the United States, Great Britain, and France, the descriptions formed to distinguish among national currency were not precise enough to distinguish between a new coin and at least one of the old coins.