Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (23 page)

The Germans were not idle on the night of 2–3 October. In the very early morning hours they launched a counterattack into the 117th Infantry positions near the crossroads south of Palenberg. Two Mark VI
tanks, accompanied by approximately twenty enemy infantrymen, first started advancing toward the brow of the hill just to the south of the crossroads. One tank pulled up and stopped 2 feet from a foxhole where squad members under Staff Sergeant Underwood of Company A were dug in. This giant Mark VI fired over the American soldiers into Palenberg, but did not stay in position for long. As one witness to the action noted, “From the rear foxholes, bazooka men and riflemen opened fire, and the tank was hit by a glancing blow and backed up in a hurry.”
³⁸

The infantry personnel that had come up with our tanks immediately hit the ground and there was a brisk fire fight for a few minutes. After the smoke cleared and the balance of the German infantrymen had withdrawn over the hill, seven of the enemy were left dead within 20 yards of the leading foxhole. One of the seven was a medic armed with a burp gun, whose pockets were full of grenades. The two tanks took up defiladed positions and fired their machineguns on the foxhole crews, but were finally discouraged by more bazooka and rifle grenade fire; they were knocked out.

Sergeant Underwood suffered three men killed and several wounded during this counterattack; later there was only sporadic firing in the Company A area, but some Germans attempted to move over to positions occupied by Captain Stoffer's Company C. As an account of this latter action noted, “The Jerries were picked off as they silhouetted themselves against the skyline.”
³⁹
Information later obtained showed that the small counterattack force was the vanguard of a German battalion.

The identity of the attacking unit was unclear. A report from the period identified the 2nd Battalion, Grenadier Regiment 330, with a platoon of Assault Gun Battalion 1183 as being “brought into the area from Beggendorf.” This same report said the night attack of this regiment “came to a halt near the chapel south of Palenberg.” Curiously, 30th Infantry Division Interrogators Prisoners of War (IPW) Team #42, based on actual POW revelations, reported “2nd Battalion of 330 Regiment moved via Beggendorf to vicinity of Palenberg for planned counterattack which did not come off. Hauptmann (Captain) Labs, CO. During the night of 2–3 October, CO disobeyed an order to attack for reasons he wished not to earn another decoration, but to spare his men.”
⁴⁰

The 30th Infantry Division IPW Team learned other valuable information on 2 October. Two officers, twenty-one noncommissioned officers, and sixty-three enlisted men from the 330th Regiment's 1st Battalion were interrogated. Organization and strength of the 183rd Division's infantry and artillery units were revealed; commanding officers’ names were even given. These POWs also offered that American “tactics in overcoming bunkers [were] well-performed,” and that “gaining the heights of Palenberg and then swinging down on the pillboxes was an excellent movement.” Perhaps most interesting, prisoners also revealed that they “expected tanks in the first wave, not infantry.”
⁴¹
Little did they know that General Hobbs's original plan had called for both.

XIX Corps counted the number of German prisoners taken on 2 October at 105; most were either from the 183rd Division or the 176th Division. Six Germans were also captured from the neighboring 49th Infantry Division. A reserve company of this division, along with other sector reserves, had made a counterthrust from the area of Herbach northeastward toward the 119th Infantry positions during the afternoon. German after-action reports recorded this effort as “not successful.”

American casualties on 2 October numbered 315; the vast majority (232) were in the 117th Infantry Regiment's rifle companies. With Lieutenant Colonel Frankland's 1st Battalion as the vanguard of the assault, Captain Kent's Company A lost twenty-four men; Spiker's Company B first suffered just two killed and eight wounded in taking seven pillboxes. Overall casualties for his company on 2 October later became three killed and twenty-six wounded. Captain Stoffer's Company C saw the most casualties; six men were killed, fifty-eight had been wounded, and ten were missing. Casualties for the attached machine gunners and mortar men from Lieutenant Cooper's Company D who were with the rifle companies totaled twenty-three. A 1st Battalion history later noted, “Casualties were high October 2. Counting wounded and killed alone, it was the worst day for the battalion in combat.”
⁴²

According to his morning report, as of 2 October Major Ammons's 2nd Battalion of the 117th Infantry Regiment suffered twelve killed and fifty-five wounded with just three men missing at the end of the day; this was adjusted to twenty-nine missing the next day.
⁴³
Captain Hoppe's Company E experienced the most casualties; five men were killed and forty-nine had been wounded. There were sixty-eight killed, wounded,
or missing reported among Colonel Sutherland's 119th Infantry Regiment companies on 2 October.

Captain McBride, Company B commander in the 119th, later accurately noted, “At the end of the first day, the enemy was still in command of all critical terrain in [our] area.”
⁴⁴
Cox's 2nd Battalion had established a thin, albeit still strongly defended bridgehead in the northern sector of the 119th Infantry Regiment's assault area in the vicinity of the Rimburg Castle and its neighboring woodlands. Just one company of Lieutenant Colonel Brown's 3rd Battalion was across the Wurm protecting the right flank of the regiment. Colonel Johnson's 117th Infantry Regiment had secured Marienburg and Palenberg, established a fragile bridgehead in Frankland's 1st Battalion zone, and was within a mile of Ubach. For its action on 2 October, the 1st Battalion was later awarded a Distinguished Unit Citation.

General der Infanterie
Köchling, commanding LXXXI Corps, noted, “The great success on the American side [was] the moment of the completely surprising action by the assault on the Westwall across the Wurm near Palenberg on the 2nd of October. This surprise [was] based on the wrong appreciation of the situation by the general command, failing air reconnaissance and insufficient ground reconnaissance. On the American side, an excellent camouflage discipline could be ascertained, which did not admit even the slightest motive for the assault intended there.”
⁴⁵

Generalleutnant
Lange agreed. “The [183rd] division was surprised when the Americans attacked at Ubach-Palenberg on 2 October. Although the terrain was somewhat unfavorable for the attacker because the Wurm River had to be crossed, and in spite of the permanent fortifications of the Westwall, our thin defense front was pushed back rather easily.”
⁴⁶

The U.S. Army official history of the period noted that Köchling had “wrongly assumed that First Army would make a strong bid northeastward through the Stolberg Corridor during the first days of October, with a possible diversion at Geilenkirchen.”
⁴⁷

Apparently the only commander to question Koechling's [
sic
] opinion was the 183d Division's General Lange; but he also guessed wrong. Cognizant of American armor opposite his division, Lange expected a major attack against his sector. Yet he
could not believe that the Americans would try to push armor across the Wurm at the point they actually had chosen because there the eastern slopes of the Wurm valley are higher and afford more commanding positions for antitank guns than do the slopes a few miles to the north at Geilenkirchen. He expected the blow to fall at Geilenkirchen in the very center of his division sector.

Even the one correct German prediction that the offensive would begin during the first days of October was to be discredited before the attack actually began. Noting on 29 September that American air activity had reached such a fortissimo that all daylight troop and supply movements in the LXXXI Corps zone had to be shut down, the Germans attached undue importance to virtual cessation of air attacks during the next two days. In reality, this could be attributed only to unfavorable weather; but when combined with lessening of American artillery fires, the Germans took it to mean that their earlier prediction had been wrong. Although General Koechling [
sic
] himself was not fooled, the fact that he expected the attack on his southern wing southeast of Aachen deprived his opinion of importance. The division commanders immediately concerned, Generals Lange and Macholz, were thoroughly lulled.

A later report citing the overall efforts of General Hobbs's 30th Infantry Division excluded the debate about the German commanders’ knowledge of where the attack would come from. Instead, the division's accomplishments on 2 October 1944 were modestly summarized as follows:

On the first day of the attack the assaulting troops made a penetration into the German lines of 1,200 yards, crossing the Wurm River and working their way into the fortresses of the Siegfried Line. This advance amounted to making a river crossing and several successful infantry attacks on a series of fortified positions, in a period of less than 24 hours. It was a good day's work.
⁴⁸

“It was now evident the enemy, after having succeeded in breaking through the Westwall, intended to continue the attack toward Alsdorf with the aim of encircling Aachen from the north and east.”

GENERALLEUTNANT
MACHOLZ

W
hile General Hobbs's regiments were breaking through the
Westwall
on 2 October, two battalions of the 29th Infantry Division were making a diversionary attack to the northwest of Geilenkirchen. The mission was twofold. The first objective was to tie down
Generalleutnant
Lange's forces manning the area, and the second was to prevent the Germans from turning south and attacking into the northern flank of the 30th Infantry Division. Colonel Birks's 120th Infantry Regiment made another diversionary attack toward the western edges of Kerkrade, in this case to thwart any buildup by the 49th Infantry Division that could threaten Lieutenant Colonel Brown's tenuous positions on the southern flank of the division.

While sensitive to these feints,
General der Infanterie
Köchling had no reason at all to believe that the Americans were actually going to turn south toward Aachen. There were even questions in the German command as to whether the breakthrough at Palenberg and Rimburg was really “it.” Were the attacks only of local significance, or were they the prelude to what Hitler was calling “the big solution,” the start of the U.S. XIX Corps’ attack to secure a bridgehead across the Rhine?
¹

But there were matters of more immediate concern that demanded Köchling's focus. Even if he was ready to accept that the 30th Division
attack was not a feint, reserves were problematic.
Generalleutnant
Macholz's 49th Division had no reserve forces. The 183rd Division's
Generalleutnant
Lange, who had taken the direct hit on 2 October, had the same problem; he possessed only one battalion in reserve—
Hauptmann
Labs's 2nd Battalion.
General der Infanterie
Köchling, therefore, had no choice but to confine both Lange's and Macholz's operations to trying to seal off the American penetration until stronger forces could arrive. Where the Americans would go next would have to wait another day.

The previous night had been uncomfortable for the Germans. When darkness fell, General Hobbs ordered his DIVARTY commander to “hammer through the night” at likely enemy assembly areas and roadways leading into the slim bridgehead held by his forces. Harassing and close-in interdiction fires responded thunderously. XIX Corps’ artillery weighed in with even more missions than those fired during the day on 2 October.
²
Lieutenant Colonel Mayer's 118th Field Artillery Battalion alone fired 1,850 rounds from their 105mm pieces starting at 0230. The 62nd Field Artillery fired another 600 rounds in support. “Much of this was used effectively in the salient which the enemy had between the 117th and the 119th Infantry Regiments,” the FA's S-3, Major Millican, recalled. “That night many screams were heard from the wooded area between the 117th and the 119th.”
³

However, when first light on 3 October revealed hazy, low clouds as light rain fell, a desperate Köchling felt that he could now move assault guns, armored vehicles, and troops from other sectors to the threatened front because American artillery observers and air reconnaissance efforts would be hampered by lack of visibility. Accordingly, he put plans in place during the morning to reinforce Lange's 183rd Division zone with nearby forces that would come under his command.

The 1st Battalion, Grenadier Regiment 352 of the 246th Division, commanded by
Hauptmann
Kreutner, was detached from its sector in Aachen with orders to move up to the Ubach area.
Generalleutnant
Lange would be provided with two battalions of infantry from the 49th Division: the 2nd Battalions of Grenadier Regiments 148 and 149. To augment his armored elements, Lange would also receive Assault Gun Brigade 902, Assault Gun Battalions 341 and 1183, as well as Assault Tank Battalion 217. These latter forces, scheduled to arrive at the front during the night of 3 October, would report to Lange and be commanded by
Hauptmann
Bracker.
⁴

General Hobbs had also made decisions. During the night of 2–3 October, orders were issued on the American side for the morning's attacks. Colonel Johnson's 117th Infantry Regiment was to secure their original D-Day objective, Ubach, and then cut the Geilenkirchen-Aachen highway and occupy the high ground to the east between Ubach and Beggendorf. This mission, consistent with the planning prior to 2 October, would fall upon Lieutenant Colonel McDowell's 3rd Battalion. Frankland's 1st Battalion was ordered to improve their positions around the pillbox line south of Palenberg and to protect the right flank of McDowell's forces when his companies passed through. Major Ammons's 2nd Battalion was to seize the remaining elusive high ground north of Palenberg, as well as the troublesome slag piles, then finish mopping up the factory area in the eastern section of the village. These attacks would all start at 0700 hours.

The general plan also called for Lieutenant Colonel Wynne's 2nd Battalion of the 67th Armored Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 41st Armored Infantry to spearhead the 2nd Armored Division crossing of the Wurm on the Marienberg-Palenberg bridge. Wynne's tanks would follow behind McDowell's 3rd Battalion, roll out toward Ubach, and then turn north on the Ubach-Hoverhof road, protecting the flank of their own armored infantry forces as they cleaned up the northern and western ends of the town. General Hobbs was to give priority to the armor of “Hell on Wheels” so that the combat commands could expand the bridgehead, thereby freeing his forces for the southward push toward Alsdorf and the eventual linkup with the 1st Infantry Division.
⁵

The 119th Infantry Regiment's mission on 3 October was to attack in the direction of Herbach and Colonel Sutherland had several factors to weigh before determining how he could accomplish this. During the previous night he had concluded that the enemy opposition in the Rimburg woods opposite Lieutenant Colonel Herlong's 1st Battalion was going to make for a tough fight. Nevertheless, he determined Herlong should attack at 0700. Cox's 2nd Battalion was to first finish cleaning up around the Rimburg Castle, and then turn south and assist the 1st Battalion in tackling the stubborn German machine-gun companies holding up their advance. Lieutenant Colonel Brown's 3rd Battalion was to hold the positions his men had gained and continue to protect the right flank
of the regiment while the other battalions worked their way to the 119th Infantry's final phase line—the crossroads atop the eastern slopes of the Wurm valley that fronted Herbach.

The attack of the 119th Infantry did not start well. When Captain Simmons's Company A men tried to work their way up to the railroad embankment toward the woods, they made no progress. Simmons remembered, “Colonel Herlong pushed [us] to try to attack the same way that had proved so unsuccessful the previous day, but we were unable to build up any line on the east side of the tracks.” Lieutenant Bons's Company C found the early going to be equally difficult. “Both assault platoons jumped off shortly after 0700,” he noted. “Fire from the woods to the east continued to give us trouble. We placed artillery [here], and then the 1st Platoon pushed up to the road but got pinned down.”
⁶

With little hope for reducing the Rimburg woods fortifications with any frontal assault, Colonel Sutherland now realized he had to put other contingency plans developed the previous night into motion. At 0815 hours he alerted hastily organized Task Force Quinn, which he had determined would be commanded by his own executive officer, Lt. Col. Daniel W. Quinn. Quinn's mission was to capitalize on the success of the 117th Infantry's advance of the day before by first moving across the Marienberg-Palenberg bridge, passing through Frankland's 1st Battalion, next turning south to flank the enemy machine-gun positions in the woods, and then pivoting and attacking them from the rear.

Task Force Quinn's infantry component was comprised of Captain McBride's Company B, as well as the reserve company of the 3rd Battalion, Capt. Earl J. Palmer Jr.'s Company I. To add armored firepower, a platoon of eleven tanks from Company B of the 743rd Tank Battalion was also assigned to the task force. To provide even more direct fire support, another two platoons of the 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion's Company C rounded out Quinn's armored vehicle strength for the attack.
⁷

When Lieutenant Colonel Quinn and the company commanders reported to Colonel Sutherland at 0900, details of the operation were disseminated. Task Force Quinn was actually given the mission of cleaning out the entire area across the 119th Infantry Regiment's front. The tanks and TDs were to first advance to the Marienberg bridge up a road running parallel to the Wurm. Since this road was under direct enemy observation, the two infantry companies were to move north using a
concealed route just to the west of this roadway. Once at the crossing site, McBride's and Palmer's men were to use the footbridges Frankland's men had crossed the Wurm on the day before, except for one platoon that would wait and accompany the armored vehicles to the other side of the river.

The infantry companies would then join up with the tanks and TDs at Palenberg and make the coordinated attack southward. Captain Palmer's Company I, with the tanks assigned to him, was to strike the upper (eastern) half of the Rimburg woods while McBride's Company B reduced the lower (western) half. The TDs were to first move south of Palenberg and protect the left flank and rear of the task force, but upon the order of either infantry company commander they could be called upon to provide closer support.
⁸

Not all went according to plan when Task Force Quinn started out. The infantry companies were first pinned down west of the river by fire from pillboxes just to the south of Palenberg. “Not until tank fire had reduced one, perhaps two of the pillboxes, did the infantry cross the river,” remembered the Assistant S-3 of the 119th Infantry Regiment, Captain Smithers. “These pillboxes, previously reduced by the 117th Infantry, had been reoccupied by a considerable number of enemy troops who were only about 200 yards away. [117th Infantry] troops were called over and they herded the Jerries off.”
⁹
Quinn moved his armored vehicles to the Marienberg bridge after this; there were no incidents as the tanks and TDs crossed over into Palenberg.

At 1050 hours, Task Force Quinn, with the infantry companies now joined with the armor, turned south and made its first contact with the Germans in the 117th Infantry sector. In the two hours that followed, the task force captured 135 prisoners from pillboxes near the factory past the crossroads before briskly advancing right into the northern boundary of the 119th Infantry Regiment. When Lieutenant Colonel Quinn reported this quick progress to Colonel Sutherland, the regimental commander cautioned him “not to get too far off the high ground [into the woods], though [your eventual] pressure on the rear of the Germans should pull the 1st Battalion through.”
¹⁰

By this time, other actions had given Sutherland reason for this cautious optimism. First, Lieutenant Colonel Cox's 2nd Battalion had secured more area around the Rimburg Castle. Second, Lieutenant Bons's
Company C, having benefited from a loan by Company F of their tanks, was able to capture two pillboxes south of the castle grounds. “Somehow the machinegun fire from the woods on the company's left stopped,” Bons recalled later. “Then the borrowed tanks and the 1st Platoon launched another attack against the first of the two pillboxes on the west side of the railroad. Four Jerries ran out and surrendered; two others came out, fought and were killed. We occupied this pillbox and then advanced on the adjoining one. Almost at once another two Jerries ran out and were killed. The second box was captured without any help from the tanks.”
¹¹

Word of this traveled fast. “Members of the 2nd Battalion informed [me at about 1400] that [they] had captured the Rimburg Castle and that Company C had captured the pillboxes,” remembered Company B's CO, Captain McBride. “They also stated that [they] and Company C had still been unable to advance beyond the railroad track.”
¹²

At this time the tank destroyer [platoon] moved forward and reverted back to regimental control. Two platoons of the task force tanks were also turned over to the 2nd Battalion, since the woods south of the east-west road were too dense for tanks to move through. The task force again resumed the attack and by 1450 had completely cleaned out the area in front of the 2nd Battalion, thus allowing that unit to start moving east up the road.

By this time Company F had received this order to attack into the woods east of the railroad line; Captain Toler's Company E was to attack abreast to the right, but both of his platoons and Company F were to hold their fire until Task Force Quinn had passed to the south. During this movement Quinn's platoons of tanks had been slowly rolling along the open ground just outside the east edge of the woods. However, as the armored vehicles attempted to pick up speed, direct enemy artillery fire came in from Herbach and the vicinity of Merkstein-Hofstadt. Then, as they were moving farther southward, a new directive came down from regiment. The platoon was ordered to stop their vehicles and take up a stationary position along the edge of the woods to protect the left flank of Quinn's infantry.